“Unconsciousness” as a clinical term is different from the absence of consciousness in the philosophical or phenomenological sense.
A sleeping person may appear unconscious to an outside observer, but from the subjective point of view, they’re not - because dreaming feels like something. A better example of what I mean by unconsciousness is general anesthesia. That doesn’t feel like anything. One moment you’re lying in the operating room counting backwards, and the next you’re in the recovery room. There’s no sense of time passing, no dreams, nothing in between - it’s just a gap.
Thomas Nagel explains this idea in What Is It Like to Be a Bat? by saying that if bats are conscious, then trading places with one wouldn’t be like the lights going out - it would feel like something to be a bat. But if you switched places with a rock, it likely wouldn’t feel like anything at all. It would be indistinguishable from dying - because there’s no subjectivity, no point of view, no experience happening.
A better example of what I mean by unconsciousness is general anesthesia. That doesn’t feel like anything. One moment you’re lying in the operating room counting backwards, and the next you’re in the recovery room. There’s no sense of time passing, no dreams, nothing in between - it’s just a gap.
I am not disagreeing. I am providing you something that demonstrates the premise you built your idea on is false.
Perhaps it’s a bad analogy then, but my point still stands: what most people experience - or rather don’t experience - under general anesthesia is the absence of consciousness. If they’re dreaming, then by definition that’s not what I’m talking about.
The point is that what people mean by “consciousness” when discussing philosophical concepts like the hard problem of consciousness is different from what a layperson typically means by the term. That is what I argue cannot be an illusion.
“Unconsciousness” as a clinical term is different from the absence of consciousness in the philosophical or phenomenological sense.
A sleeping person may appear unconscious to an outside observer, but from the subjective point of view, they’re not - because dreaming feels like something. A better example of what I mean by unconsciousness is general anesthesia. That doesn’t feel like anything. One moment you’re lying in the operating room counting backwards, and the next you’re in the recovery room. There’s no sense of time passing, no dreams, nothing in between - it’s just a gap.
Thomas Nagel explains this idea in What Is It Like to Be a Bat? by saying that if bats are conscious, then trading places with one wouldn’t be like the lights going out - it would feel like something to be a bat. But if you switched places with a rock, it likely wouldn’t feel like anything at all. It would be indistinguishable from dying - because there’s no subjectivity, no point of view, no experience happening.
Some studies on dreams under anesthesia.
https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC4970206/
https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC5668036/
What do you disagree with here exactly?
I am not disagreeing. I am providing you something that demonstrates the premise you built your idea on is false.
Perhaps it’s a bad analogy then, but my point still stands: what most people experience - or rather don’t experience - under general anesthesia is the absence of consciousness. If they’re dreaming, then by definition that’s not what I’m talking about.
The point is that what people mean by “consciousness” when discussing philosophical concepts like the hard problem of consciousness is different from what a layperson typically means by the term. That is what I argue cannot be an illusion.
I think you need to work on your argument.